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dc.contributor.authorSeleka, Tebogo Bruce
dc.contributor.authorLekobane, Khaufelo R.
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-14T07:15:11Z
dc.date.available2023-02-14T07:15:11Z
dc.date.issued2016-08-10
dc.identifier.citationSeleka, T. B., & Lekobane, K. (2014). Public transfers and subsistence producer disincentives in Botswana.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819994
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/13049/622
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the disincentive effects of public transfers on subsistence producers in Botswana. Comparative statics analyses indicate that public transfers would not affect farm production when profit and utility maximization decisions are recursive, with the profit maximization decision made first. However, when such decisions are interdependent, public transfers would lead to a reduction in farm output. Empirical results reveal that social pensions have impacted positively on cultivated area, but have had no impact on cereal yields and output. However, government food rations have impacted adversely on cultivated area, yields and output; they are a disincentive to crop production because they are relatively more sizable, consistent and certain. This, it is argued, is because food packages are directly substitutable for subsistence crop production. Therefore, public policy in Botswana should consider moving away from food to cash transfers to minimize such disincentive effects.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherBotswana Institute for Development Policy Analysisen_US
dc.subjectBotswanaen_US
dc.subjectPublic transfersen_US
dc.subjectSafety netsen_US
dc.subjectSubsistence agricultureen_US
dc.subjectWelfareen_US
dc.titlePublic transfers and subsistence producer disincentives in Botswanaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US


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